BY BBC

Votes are being counted in South Africa’s election, with President Cyril Ramaphosa hoping to prevent a slide in support for the governing African National Congress (ANC).

With results declared in some 46% of districts, it has won about 57% of the ballot, well ahead of the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) on 23%.

The ANC took 62% at the last general election in 2014.

Anger over the economy and corruption may have eroded its appeal.

The radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), is in third place with 9%, based on the official early results.

Turnout was about 65% in the twin parliamentary and provincial elections – a drop compared to the 73% registered five years ago.

Some six million young people didn’t register to vote.

Full results are due on Saturday.

Strong mandate needed

Unsurprisingly the top three parties so far are the ANC, the DA and the EFF.

But the party to watch is the ANC – not least because its support has dwindled in the last few years amid corruption scandals.

After sacking its beleaguered leader, Jacob Zuma, just under two years ago, the new man in charge, Cyril Ramaphosa, went on an anti-corruption campaign.

He called this a “new dawn” for one of Africa’s oldest liberation movement? But did it work?

The numbers will help answer that. Under Mr Zuma, the party won by 62% in the last election – for some that’s the magic number to beat.

This will be a difficult ask this time around for the hugely divided party. Mr Ramaphosa needs a strong mandate – only then can he hope to affect real renewal within the party.

Then there is the DA, which increased its support in the last election from 17% to 22% but will be hoping to win more provinces this time around – and make inroads, particularly in areas where the ANC had previously been dominant.

Then there is the EFF, which need to show that it can continue to grow its support base.

Provincially, the prize everyone is vying for is Gauteng – the economic hub of the country. Control that and you pretty much control the whole country.

This will also be an indication of whether Mr Ramaphosa’s message to business has been effective.

The president’s apology

Casting his vote in the country’s sixth democratic national election since apartheid ended 25 years ago, President Ramaphosa acknowledged the “rampant corruption” of recent years.

President Cyril Ramaphosa arrives to cast his vote at a primary school in Soweto
“We have made mistakes but we have been sorry about those mistakes and we are saying our people should reinvest their confidence in us,” he said.

“Corruption got into the way, patronage got into the way and not focusing on the needs of our people got in the way.”

The ANC, which led the fight against apartheid, has governed the country since 1994.

Why has the ANC lost support?

Young people queuing to vote spoke of their difficulties in finding jobs, with unemployment at 27%.

One young voter said her future employment prospects were on her mind. “I don’t feel confident about getting the job I want,” she said.

“I’m a member of the ANC but I didn’t vote for them this time,” construction worker Thabo Makhene told Reuters news agency. “They need to catch a wake-up. The way they run the state, mishandling state funds, they’ve lost their morals.”

However, many voters stayed loyal to the ANC.

Esau Zwane, 90, waiting to vote in Soweto, Johannesburg, lived under white-minority rule. He told the BBC he was celebrating “that our country is now ruled by black people”.

Votes are cast for parties, with seats in the 400-member National Assembly allocated according to the share of the vote gained by each party.

These MPs then elect a president.

Election in numbers:

26.76 million registered voters

55% of them are female

A record 48 parties on the ballot

28,757 voting stations

220,000 members of electoral staff

Six million young people did not register to vote

How big an issue is land reform?

Apartheid, in place from 1948 to 1994, legalised racial discrimination in favour of white people, and land ownership has remained a contentious issue.

Mmusi Maimane’s Democratic Alliance is tipped to increase its vote
The white minority still owns disproportionately more land than the black majority. The EFF has led the charge in trying to change this.

The BBC’s Andrew Harding in Johannesburg says the party’s stance has forced the ANC to consider drastic measures to transfer more land, more quickly, into black hands, which has resulted in a pledge to conduct land expropriation without compensation.

However, the DA says it does not believe land reform needs to be “carried out in a way that takes from one to give to another”, and instead promises to prioritise land reform in the budget and to release unused government land.

Other election issues include discontent over poor basic services such as water, housing and electricity, and anger over violent crime.

As well as the continued inequalities, it is thought that the failure to tackle corruption has damaged the ANC.

President Ramaphosa came to power last year pledging to get to grips with the issue but some voters still associate the party with the corruption which thrived under Mr Zuma.

Mr Zuma faces trial on numerous charges of corruption but has denied any wrongdoing.

Votes are cast for party lists with seats in the 400-member National Assembly allocated according to the percentage vote of each party.

These MPs then elect a president.

Guest Column Joseph Ogutu

ACROSS the world, migratory animals like wildebeest — which rely on movement to find food, water and calving grounds — are under threat.

This is mainly because their migration routes are being cut off by fences, settlements, farms, roads and other developments, and the areas where they roam are getting smaller. The animals also face the additional challenges of poaching and having less food to eat because of livestock overgrazing and agriculture.

We wanted to know how wildebeest migrations in East Africa were faring. To do this we analysed trends in the region’s five remaining migratory wildebeest populations. We used maps from the colonial era, literature reviews and aerial survey databases. We also used GPS collared animals and held interviews with researchers and residents to assess how wildebeest migration routes and populations have changed over time.

We found extreme declines in the numbers of migrating wildebeest and loss of most migration routes in Kenya and Tanzania. Four of the five contemporary migrations, including the Mara-Loita migration, are severely threatened and have virtually collapsed.

This collapse increases the risk of local extinctions of wildebeest in four historically wildlife-rich East African ecosystems. This is because they are obstructed from accessing critical resources.

The study

East Africa’s remaining populations of migratory wildebeest are found in five ecosystems. Using aerial survey monitoring data, collected over almost 60 years (from 1957 to 2016) in Kenya and Tanzania, we found that four migrations have virtually collapsed. The Athi-Kaputiei, Amboseli and Mara-Loita migrations are the most severely threatened.

Serengeti-Mara

This covers about 40 000km2 and straddles Kenya and Tanzania.

Since 1977, the total number of wildebeest in the area stayed at roughly 1.3 million individuals. But the number of wildebeest crossing from the Serengeti to the Maasai
Mara went down by 73%, from 588 000 animals in 1979 to 157 000 in 2016.

Greater Amboseli

Covering an area of about 7 730km2, this area also straddles Kenya and Tanzania.
The Amboseli’s migrating population declined by 85% from 16 300 animals in 1977 to under 2 400 in 2014.

Mara-Loita

This covers about 7 500km2 in south-western Kenya.

The number of migrating wildebeest here has crashed by 81% from over 123 000 animals in 1977, to under 20 000 in 2016.

Athi-Kaputiei
This spans 2 200km2 and is near Nairobi, Kenya’s capital. The Athi-Kaputiei’s migrating population fell by 95% from 27 000 animals in 1977 to less than 3 000 in 2014.

Tarangire-Manyara

Found in northern Tanzania, the Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem and adjoining village lands, covers 35 000km2. The number of migrating wildebeest has decreased by 72% since
1990, that is, from 48 800 to 13 600 animals in 2016.

Leading threats

The threats facing the various populations differ in each area. The leading causes of decline are poorly planned agricultural expansion, fences, settlements, urban centres, roads and other infrastructure, poaching and competition with livestock for food, space and drinking water. Government policy in Kenya also encourages private over communal
land tenure. This promotes land subdivision.

Fences, for example, are expanding fast in the Mara-Loita ecosystem. This was driven by the splitting of former group ranches — communally owned land — and the formation of
some wildlife conservancies.

Ultimately, the threats are driven by increasing human and livestock numbers. The way land is used (from former grazing areas to farmland) is changing and there’s also more
human-wildlife conflict as more animals come into contact with people.
So, there have been failures on a number of fronts. These include policies that don’t regulate where people settle, wildlife conservation and management policies.

A key government wildlife policy failure in Kenya is that it has focused primarily on protected areas. But these areas cover only 8% of the country’s land surface and
support only 35% of the wildlife. The other 65% occupies private lands, which all the four threatened wildebeest migrations cross.

A huge problem here is that there is no incentive for private landowners to look after wildlife. They receive little to no benefit from wildlife. This is because Kenya
banned the use of and trade in wildlife and wildlife products in 1977. This restricts opportunities to game viewing. But tourists don’t visit many areas and so other land
uses, like agriculture and livestock production, are more appealing.

What must be done

Urgent action is needed to save these migrations. Unfortunately, warnings like these are often ignored by the national institutions that conserve wildlife.
Saving the migrations means much more regulation, securing more land, partnering with local communities and, ultimately, reducing human population growth, in particular,
the regulation of livestock numbers, fences, settlements, farms and roads.

Land must be restored — meaning settlements cleared and cultivation on migration routes stopped — and key rivers (like the Mara River which could be dammed) must be
protected. Deforestation must also be better managed.

Major roads that cut across migratory routes should include under or over passes for migrating wildlife. And robust law enforcement is needed to reduce the illegal hunting
of animals for bushmeat.

There have been attempts to protect migratory pathways by forming wildlife conservancies. These have been set up by private landowners, usually in collaboration with a
tourism partner, to protect areas while providing land rents and jobs to local communities. But more support is needed by communities and investors in tourism to plan, expand and manage these conservancies which are outside State-protected areas.

The weakness of these conservancies is that they usually lease land from communities for a short period. But they’re expensive to maintain because the land that’s leased
covers large areas. Another option would be for the State and other conservation actors to buy land for conservation.

Another intervention is that the community benefit more from wildlife, in terms of jobs and income, predominantly through tourism. This would reduce incentives for poaching
and habitat degradation.

There must also be greater coordination and collaboration between Kenya and Tanzania to conserve trans-boundary migrations.

The fact that intense droughts have become more frequent makes these changes the more urgent.

Guest column: Thomas McNamara

ALMOST every global development body, from the World Bank to small, single-issue NGOs, claim to listen to or work with “the community”. In many African countries, particularly rural villages, community engagement involves meeting and consulting with chiefs.

Yet, even practitioners who go to great lengths to engage with chiefs often treat “the chieftaincy” as homogeneous. In this view, chiefs are either dedicated developers with exactly the same interests as the (equally homogenous) community, or they are barriers to development who must be educated.

But how do these chiefs or headmen view the NGOs? And how do the NGOs’ efforts hinder or help the chiefs in consolidating their own power? In a recent study, I explored
these questions. I examined how traditional leaders in several Malawian villages attempted to use NGOs’ presence to solidify or change their relationships with their
constituents, including how NGOs influenced what “development” meant to villagers.

These are important issues to consider in the context of Malawi. Small, foreign-funded NGOs dominate the country’s rural areas. The nation is one of the world’s poorest and
40% of its recurrent spending is provided by donors, often distributed through small NGOs.

These organisations maintain offices in areas that are too remote for larger NGOs. They claim that their competitive advantage lies in their closeness to the community –
and the village’s chieftaincy. This means liaising with the traditional authority in the form of the leader who controls hundreds or even thousands of villages, each with their own village headmen. Traditional authorities are typically wealthy and urbane. Village headmen, on the other hand, are as poor as their constituents.

I found that the mere presence of NGOs, no matter their size or aims, inadvertently reduced the legitimacy of local village headmen, often through encouraging villagers to link development to wealth and westernisation.

Headmens’ experiences

I used the pseudonym Vsawa as a collective name for the villages I observed. There, two small NGOs maintained permanent offices and two others had full-time staff. These
organisations were wealthy compared to the communities in which they operated and, through donor visits, these NGOs inadvertently implied that development was gifted into
the community by (western) outsiders.

This was challenging for headmen, who often maintained their legitimacy by presenting development as occurring through communal cohesion under their leadership.

For instance, one village headman attempted to persuade his constituents that he had special influence over the NGOs. He attended every NGO meeting, told his villagers that
the development projects he organised were inspired by the NGO and took trees from its forestry project to plant in front of his house. This tactic was initially successful. But then the NGO failed to extend a no-interest micro-credit programme in his village. This dented his authority among his constituents.

Another headmen took an entirely different tack. He did not participate in events with the staff of a similar small NGO that had a permanent office in his village and would
not reward villagers who worked with the NGO to “develop” his village. This approach backfired when villagers attempted to abduct an NGO employee accused of witchcraft. The
NGO manager publicly reprimanded the headman and used her superior connections with the government and police to have some of the alleged kidnappers arrested.

As one villager told me:

The chief was angry at Katherine (the NGO manager) so he tried to stop her, but she shouted at him and he was afraid. Now the people are angry and we go to the chief, but the chief is quiet, so we go to Katherine, but then she shouts… she shouts to … the MP and to the government … The NGO wanted to show us that the old ways were over and
that Malawi is developing now …

Village life altered

What is striking about these and other stories I gathered during my study is how unimportant the specific development projects’ stated goals were to their impact upon
intra-village understandings and hierarchies. Simply put, it didn’t matter what work they were doing. Their very presence affected village life by altering what development meant, and implying that headmen could not provide it.

Equally important, each NGO had permission from what it understood to be “the chief” to operate in “the community”, but did not understand how power and authority was held and diffused through the chieftaincy.

These findings are important as small NGOs and private donors grow increasingly important to rural African development. Such organisations need to be aware of how they influence the values and understanding of the communities they operate in.

guest column Steven Friedman

SOUTH Africans were yesterday voting in the most competitive election they’ve had since democracy began in 1994. But, despite this, the poll will have far more impact on the factional battle within the governing African National Congress (ANC) than on the contest between it and other parties for control of government.

The election follows a decline in the ANC vote from just under 70% in 2004 to around 54% in 2016’s local elections. This seemed to signal that the ANC was no longer guaranteed re-election nationally and in most provinces. There has been much talk of the ANC vote sinking below 50%, forcing it to seek coalition partners if it wants to govern.

In Gauteng, the country’s economic heartland, the ANC won only 46% in the 2016 municipal elections and was forced into opposition in two metropolitan areas — Tshwane and Johannesburg.

This happened because the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a breakaway from the ANC which espouses a more militant brand of African nationalism, agreed to support the country’s second biggest party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), even though they differ on just about everything.

This raised the possibility that a similar arrangement this time will mean the ANC will no longer govern in Gauteng or nationally.

So, is South Africa about to see its first election in which national power changes hands? No. The ANC is almost certain to remain in government in all the eight provinces it controls, including Gauteng.

This will leave the Western Cape, which the DA holds and is likely to retain despite claims that it is in trouble, as the only province in which the ANC is not in government.

This prediction is not based on opinion polls which, in this election, have continued their tradition of doing more to confuse than inform. One poll has the ANC at 61%.

Another says it is on the cusp of losing its majority. The DA’s projected vote veers just as wildly. The only constant is claims that the EFF will improve although this is
not what is happening in municipal by-elections, where its support remains largely unchanged.

So, the polls tell us little and there is a good argument for ignoring them. But they do have one use, that is: They largely agree on what won’t happen: the ANC won’t lose power.

Why the ANC is sitting pretty
Predicting that the ANC will remain in government outside the Western Cape is based on political common sense.

Talk of the ANC dropping below 50% often ignores the reality that, just about everywhere, the opposition is far behind it. The nearest an opposition party comes to
challenging it outside the Western Cape is in Gauteng where the DA won 37% in 2016.

Elsewhere, the nearest opposition party trails by 30 percentage points or more. The only way the ANC could be removed from government is by another deal between the DA and EFF.

But EFF leader Julius Malema has said that it will not make a deal with the DA and is more likely to look to a coalition with the ANC. What politicians say about coalitions
cannot always be taken seriously and later Malema said the EFF would consider a coalition with the DA or ANC if they agreed to improve conditions in the townships where
black poor people live.

But a DA-EFF coalition seems impossible, whatever Malema says now. For one thing, their positions on land, a core EFF concern, are diametrically opposed.

This does not matter in local government, which does not decide on land policy. It would matter hugely in national government and to a degree in the provinces.

If there is no DA-EFF deal, the only way the ANC can lose its hold on government anywhere is if either party wins a majority or at least enough to allow them to govern with small parties. But in Gauteng, no poll puts the DA above 38% — its numbers elsewhere are much weaker.

In North West province — the ANC’s weakest outside Gauteng and Western Cape — the EFF is the second biggest party and it won only 16% in 2016. No poll has the EFF vote
improving by more than eight percentage points.

ANC factions

Nationally and outside the Western Cape, then, two results are possible: The ANC wins a majority or is by far the biggest party and the only one able to form a coalition.

The reality which predictions of a change in government ignore — the absence of another party which could defeat the ANC — means that even if the ANC does as badly as one
poll says it will, it will still be the party of government just about everywhere.

But, while the election will not change the government, it may change the balance between the two factions which compete for power within the ANC. — One supports President Cyril Ramaphosa, while the other backed former President Jacob Zuma.

The Zuma faction is still strongly represented in ANC decision-making forums. The battle between the two factions continues and the difference between them is often greater
than that between the ANC and parts of the opposition. It is impossible to make sense of anything the ANC does without knowing which faction was behind it.

Ramaphosa was elected in 2017 because key ANC figures, most notably current Deputy President David Mabuza, believed the ANC could not win this election if it was led by the
Zuma faction. Ramaphosa’s credibility with some ANC power brokers depends, therefore, on showing that he can stem the ANC’s decline at the polls.

If the ANC improves on its 2016 vote, Ramaphosa will have presided over the first increase in its vote for 15 years. This will greatly improve his chances of winning re-
election as ANC president at its next conference in 2022 because it will signal to ANC politicians that he can deliver more seats.

Because many South Africans are excluded from the benefits of the market, seats in municipal councils and legislatures are often the only ticket into the middle-class.

So, an ANC gain in this election is certain to strengthen Ramaphosa now and in 2022 by showing that his leadership offers more opportunities to ANC politicians.

Even if it matches the last result or comes close, ANC power brokers could still decide that Ramaphosa saved them from the opposition benches.
If the ANC drops to near 50%, whether Ramaphosa would be at risk of losing in 2022 would depend on whether ANC delegates could be persuaded to blame Zuma and his
supporters.

That is hardly assured. What is clear is that, the worse the ANC does, the better the Zuma group’s chances are of removing Ramaphosa at the national conference in 2022.

The two factions have very different approaches to governing and so the battle between them affects the country’s future. It is this battle, not that between the parties,
which will be shaped by the election result.

This article was updated to reflect the correct date for when the ANC could remove Ramaphosa, if they chose to.

BY MTHANDAZO NYONI

THE Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association (Zela) has petitioned Parliament to urgently review laws that promote sustainable in environmental practices by mining corporations.

The organisation said it was concerned by the rate of environmental degradation within the mining sector and the prevalence of human rights violations by mining corporations in Zimbabwe.

It also said it was alarmed by government’s administrative lethargy in promoting responsible investments within the extractive sector.

“Desirous of seeing responsible investment that ensures that Zimbabwean mining laws conform to international and regional standards, norms and principles to which Zimbabwe
is a signatory, now, therefore, the petitioners beseech the Parliament of Zimbabwe to implore the Executive to uphold the Constitution by ensuring mining sector investments
are in compliance with the provisions of the Constitution and international obligations and standards,” reads part of the petition.

Zimbabwe’s mining sector together with agriculture and tourism are expected to anchor growth of the economy.

“However, while commonly presented as a sector providing development opportunities for the national government and local communities, mining activities in Zimbabwe have
repeatedly triggered a myriad of problems such as livelihood shifts, displacements from ancestral lands and insidious social, cultural, environmental, and economic
changes,” it said.

Zela believes that policies should be suitably tailored to promote intra and inter-generational equity in the mining sector.

“Without the necessary legal basis, local communities in Zimbabwe will continue to suffer at the hands of mining corporations,” the petition reads.

“A mutually beneficial partnership between the State, the private sector, civil society, local communities and other stakeholders must be developed. Harnessing mineral
resources for economic development and community empowerment is critical in addressing the poverty scourge and improving the quality of life for all Zimbabweans as envisioned by section 13 of the Constitution.”

Zela appealed to Parliament to investigate, punish and redress human rights abuses occasioned by mining sector investments.

BY BUSINESS REPORTER

The Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (Praz) has put in place new provisions for procurement officers to make them more answerable and transparent in carrying out their duties.

The new rules, which include a code of conduct, were introduced in Praz Circular Number 6, dated May 3, 2019, which will now require procurement officers to submit a signed undertaking to commit to given ethics.

The undertaking is in accordance with Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDPA) Act and comes as government ramps up efforts to stamp out corruption.

“Section 70(3) of the PPDPA Act provides that ‘before a procurement officer enters upon his or her office as such, he or she, in writing, undertakes to (a) faithfully exercise the functions assigned to him or her as a procurement officer and (b) abide by the rules of conduct provided for by or under this Act, including the code of conduct referred to in Section 71’,” the circular read.

“The accounting officer is, therefore, directed in terms of section 7(b) of the PPDPA Act to submit signed ‘undertakings’ by staff employed in the procurement management units established in terms of section 17 of the Act; staff that form ad hoc ‘evaluation committees’ established in terms of section 18 of the Act; staff involved in the implementation of procurement contracts from operations and finance.”

Praz has given until end of this month for procurement officers to sign the new rules listed in the undertaking.

“Please, ensure that the signed ‘undertakings’ are received by May 31, 2019,” the circular read.

Part of the major actions that procurement officers will now be required to commit to abiding by the code of conduct in section 71 of the PPDPA Act and accepting the
consequences of breach of duty.

“The code of conduct shall provide for all matters relating to the conduct of the officers and employees concerned, in so far as they are engaged in procurement,” part of section 71 of the PPDPA Act read.

EDITORIAL

IN what has become more of a ritual at the beginning of every term, some schools have started sending pupils away over unpaid fees.

This is a sad development in view of the fact that school fees, just like other services, have skyrocketed, while salaries have remained stagnant, and others even eroded as
Zimbabwe’s surrogate bond note chases the elusive United States dollar value.

While it is understandable that schools need to meet certain costs if they are to remain viable and continue to offer quality education, there is need to strike a balance
and come up with payment plans to allow hard-pressed parents to pay perhaps in instalments throughout the term while children are in school.

This will ensure that education, which is a constitutional right of the child regardless of whether or not their parents can afford it, does not become a preserve of the
elite.

Everyone is aware of the economic meltdown that has significantly eroded the value of the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) dollar, so there is no need to be punitive.
Parents also need some form of economic reprieve.

It is the desire of every parent to ensure that their children go to school and access education, so there is no need for schools to behave as if they are not operated by fellow human beings who also have children.

Parents are being forced by circumstances beyond their control to cut back on other essential services so that they can educate their children despite the ballooning cost
of living.

Remember parents also have to buy other educational materials such as textbooks and pens, whose prices have also ballooned alongside those of other basic goods and
services.

Having said this, it is important to acknowledge that the government is duty-bound to ensure that it puts effective economic policies in place to ensure that education does
not become a luxury, but remains the basic right that it is.

The disparity between the US dollar and the RTGS dollar, in particular, has caused untold mayhem because it is an unsupported currency that has proved to be unsustainable.

The school fees debacle is just a tip of the iceberg pointing to an entire economy in a mess, given that the teachers are also disgruntled amid indications that they may embark on a go-slow or full-scale industrial action as price increases continue to erode their RTGS-denominated salaries.

The challenges that have come with the surrogate currency also extend to medical aid and funeral policies whose contributions have also been arbitrarily increased, leaving
the majority of workers with very little disposable income.

The government cannot continue to ignore the need to adopt holistic and genuine currency reforms, as continuing on this trajectory will likely cause an implosion or
catapult us back to the horrors of 2008.

By NQOBANI NDLOVU

Buy Zimbabwe says it will on Friday launch a national awareness programme emphasising the need for consumption of locally-made products to boost industry’s production capacity and eventually bring down the country’s import bill.

Zimbabweans are grappling with the ever-increasing cost of goods, most of them imported as companies increase costs to try and hedge against losses, including a falling RTGS dollar in order to restock.

Buy Zimbabwe spokesperson Tapiwa Ziwewe said the buy local campaign starting Friday would run under the theme Reviving the Local Industry through Stakeholder Engagement,
Awareness and Participation’.

“One of the communication strategies being pursued is the conducting of roadshows countrywide using the public broadcaster to sensitise the general public and consumers on
the importance of buying local products,” Ziwewe said in a statement.

Government has placed some products on import restrictions as part of a strategy to narrow its trade deficit, and help revive local industries.

According to the industrialists, Zimbabwe needs over US$8 billion to replace old equipment in its factories and revive local industries.

“In this regard, local companies are being requested to provide promotional materials to be used during the roadshows in the form of T-shirts, caps, fliers and products.
Local companies are encouraged to participate,” Ziwewe added.

Buy Zimbabwe’s mandate is to promote, deepen and broaden the utilisation of locally-sourced and produced resources in order to yield quality and globally competitive
Zimbabwean brands for sustainable economic growth.

As part of the local content strategy, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce has incorporated the local production and consumption awareness programme (Make Local Buy Local
Campaign) under the government’s rapid results initiative.

The ministry has partnered with Buy Zimbabwe to conduct the ‘Make Local Buy Local Campaigns’, which are aimed at appraising various stakeholders on the importance of local
production and consumption.

The programme has targeted various stakeholders such as government institutions, industry and consumers (wherein different messages and communication strategies are used for different stakeholders.

The intense scrutiny that a company like Facebook comes under, coupled with the sense the corporation is more than just business, means that rumour and speculation go hand in hand with almost any statement put out by the tech giant.

A couple of months ago, as reported by Bloomberg, Facebook sent out a memo with the following bottom line “Facebook is exploring ways to leverage the power of blockchain technology. This new small team is exploring many different applications. We don’t have anything further to share”.

The final line, “we don’t have anything further to share”, has not stopped a huge among of speculation and conjecture about what Facebook intends to do in cryptocurrency, and what the goals are with its “Project Libra”. For many, the most pertinent question is if you will be able to buy this so called “Facecoin” in the same manner, say, that you can buy Bitcoin.

Facecoin will likely aim for stability

The most likely answer is ‘yes’. Although, “Facecoin” (the name has been applied by the press, rather than Facebook) is expected to be fixed against a major currency, like the dollar, or perhaps a combination of major currencies. The idea is that the cryptocurrency will not be subject to the volatility that can attract Bitcoin traders looking to make fast profits.

Indeed, while there has been lots of media speculation over Facebook and cryptocurrency, more fuel has been added to the fire when the Wall Street Journal recently reported that Facebook was actively recruiting financial firms to start exploring a viable route to developing the cryptocurrency for the social media platform.

Part of the reasoning applied to this move by Facebook is transform its payments platform, allowing its users to buy the new token, and use it to make payments across Facebook and other internet sites. For Facebook the attraction might come with the elimination, or lowering, of processing fees by traditional payment companies.

Low cost cross-border payments could be key

At the moment, transaction fees are quite low – almost costless – with traditional payment methods if those transactions are end-to-end in the same currency. It becomes expensive at the point of exchange from one currency to another. That’s especially important in a region like Africa, and a crypto-payment that helps money flow in cheaply from abroad could be significant.

Other cryptocurrencies, specifically Ripple, have been designed to facilitate low cost cross-border payments, but it’s clear Facebook doing something similar could provide access on a completely different scale.

Yet, media reporting has stopped short of saying that Facebook’s payment system will be anything like, for example, WeChat Pay, the Chinese-backed internet payment solution that allows scanning an instant payment through smartphones. It’s been a social phenomenon in China, with the media focusing on the slogan, “even beggars have QR codes.” But it should be noted that WeChat Pay still relies on traditional banking, not using any cryptocurrencies.

Obviously, Zimbabwe has its own challenges with regards to an innovation like this, and it’s not as if people will be pinging Facebook tokens to each other on the streets of Harare. However, these types of innovations, especially if Facebook is able to stabilize the value of the token, could be embraced in Zimbabwe and other parts of Africa which have been hurt by hyper inflation in the past.

Of course, all of this is still just speculation. We are still waiting for Facebook to clearly define its goals for cryptocurrency. But as it stands, don’t expect the excitement over “Facecoin” to die down any time soon.

SNEAK PEEK Freeman Makopa

Zimdancehall chanter Freeman – real name Emegy Sylvester Chizanga (EC) – who shot to fame after releasing his hit song Joina City, continues to rise.

Having started off as a butcher boy, he is now one of the topmost Zimdancehall musicians in the country. He speaks to NewsDay (ND) Life & Style reporter Freeman Makopa.

ND: Who is Freeman and how did he rise to fame?

EC: I was born in 1988 and grew up in Bindura, and did my education there before relocating to Harare in 2007. I used to play soccer and in 2008 played for a Division One side. From there, I worked as a butcher boy at the age of 18. In 2010, that’s when I started doing my recording seriously.

ND: Usually, when artistes go to perform on big stages, some rowdy fans have a tendency of throwing missiles at them. Has that happened to you?

EC: Sometimes it’s not hatred, but the problem will be with the artiste. For instance, if you perform badly, that’s when you encounter such scenarios and as for me, yes, it happened when I was performing at Gwanzura Stadium in Highfield, Harare. I was later advised that it was a set-up.

ND: How do you deal with negative criticism?

EC: I have realised that if you have critics in your career, that alone will motivate you to scale greater heights. Being a musician is a tough journey, so one has to keep their head high.

ND: You had a childhood dream of playing for the national soccer team. Why did you shift to music?

EC: I used to play soccer from my school days, and I even played for Division One sides, NDS and Bindura FC. And before, I used to go for training after studio until I found that the music industry provided more opportunities.

ND: In February, ExQ walked away the biggest winner at StarFM awards for the song Nzenza, which you did together. There were social media rumours that you are no longer in good books, which is why he did not acknowledge you. Is that true?

EC: We are true friends and have always been in good books. Yes, ExQ didn’t give me credit, but he was just excited and he forgot to, which is not an issue. We met later and he gave me something. I can tell you that ExQ is my friend.

ND: Some fans, especially those who have never been to Harare, still think Joina City is a lodge or motel because of the lyrics in your song, Joina City. Can you tell us how you came up with that song?

EC: Joina City is a city in Panama. There was a friend of mine who went there when we were young and he used to say ‘Sly (nickname), come to Joina City here in Panama; it’s an amazing place.’ So, I was not referring to our local Joina City (mall) when I wrote the song around 2009 while Joina City was still under construction.

ND: Do you perform with a full band?

EC: Yes, it’s called HkD.

ND: Since you are married, how do you handle female fans that throw themselves at you?

EC: This happens a lot. Girls throw themselves at me, but I just treat them as my sisters because some of them come with a hidden agenda, targeted at tarnishing my image.

ND: Which international artistes do you wish to do collabos with?

EC: I wish to work with Vybz Kartel. He is one of my icons and in Africa, I would love to work with Stone Bwoy from Ghana and Patoranking.

ND: How do you handle your celebrity status?

EC: We are trying to walk in the shoes of celebrities, but at times it’s difficult to do something when you are a celebrity.

ND: Is music paying you enough to live on or you have other sources of income?

EC: Music is paying, I don’t want to lie. I thank God for that because I am where I am today because of music.

ND: How do your fans access your music?

EC: They do so through Facebook, my YouTube channel, Instagram, iTunes and my WhatsApp groups.

ND: Are you still recording in Dzivarasekwa?

EC: I record anywhere (as long as there is a studio available). In DZ, there is Bigyards, and I record some of my songs there. I have also recorded with Mount Zion, Jippers, DJ Tamuka and Simplex.

ND: Your parting shot?

EC: Stay strong and put God first in everything you do, and you will never go wrong. I will also take this opportunity to thank my fans who have supported me right from the start.